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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
WAYMO LLC,
Plaintiff,
    v.
UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC.;
OTTOMOTTO LLC; and OTTO
TRUCKING LLC,
Defendants.
                                                                     /
No. C 17-00939 WHA
ORDER EXCLUDING
MICHAEL WAGNER,
RESTRICTING USE OF
FINANCIAL EVIDENCE 
AT TRIAL, AND DENYING
OTHER RELIEF
(UNDER SEAL)
INTRODUCTION
In this action for trade secret misappropriation, defendants move to strike plaintiff’s
initial disclosures and to preclude its damages claims and certain witnesses.  Defendants also
move to exclude plaintiff’s damages expert, and to exclude evidence of certain financial
information pertinent to plaintiff’s damages theory.  Defendants’ motion to exclude Michael
Wagner is GRANTED.  Their motion to exclude evidence of financial information is GRANTED
IN PART and DENIED IN PART as stated herein.  Except to the extent stated herein, their motion
to strike is DENIED.
STATEMENT
The factual and procedural background of this action has been detailed in prior orders
and need not be repeated here.  In July of this year, defendants Uber Technologies, Inc.,
Ottomotto LLC (collectively, “Uber”), and Otto Trucking LLC moved to strike plaintiff Waymo
LLC’s initial disclosures and to preclude its damages claims and certain witnesses (Dkt. Nos.
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28 1  For the benefit of the court of appeals and with apologies to the public, most record citations herein
are to the unredacted versions of the documents cited.
2
797, 942).  A prior order held those motions in abeyance pending evaluation of Waymo’s
eventual damages theory (see Dkt. No. 1261 at 78:6–14).1
After discovery closed and the parties disclosed expert reports, defendants moved to
exclude the testimony and opinions of Waymo’s hired damages expert Michael Wagner (Dkt.
Nos. 1614-4, 1653).  Wagner is not an economist but merely an inactive certified public
accountant and inactive California-licensed attorney.  He currently works as managing director
at LitiNomics, Inc., “a financial and economic consulting firm specializing in the analysis of
economic issues that arise in commercial disputes.”  He claims to have “specialized in the
computation of commercial damages over the last 40 years of [his] professional career” (Dkt.
No. 1615 ¶¶ 3–5).  Defendants also moved in limine to exclude evidence of certain financial
information pertinent to Waymo’s damages theory (Dkt. No. 1557-4).  Both motions were heard
at the first final pretrial conference on September 27.  
While those motions hung fire, Waymo voluntarily dismissed its patent claims (Dkt.
Nos. 841, 1593) and another order granted summary judgment of no liability in favor of Otto
Trucking (Dkt. No. 2151).  Insofar as it pertains to Waymo’s patent claims, Uber’s motion to
strike (Dkt. No. 797) has therefore been mooted.  Otto Trucking’s separate motion to strike
(Dkt. No. 942) has also been mooted.  The issues remaining for adjudication pertain only to
Waymo’s damages theory against Uber for alleged trade secret misappropriation.  With the full
benefit of multiple rounds of briefing and hearing, this order now resolves those issues.
ANALYSIS
1. MOTION TO EXCLUDE MICHAEL WAGNER.
“A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:  (a) the expert’s scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence
or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably
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2  A prior order deleted asserted trade secret number 96 from the original list of nine selected for trial
(see Dkt. No. 2151 at 13–18).  Number 96 is nevertheless mentioned in this order only to faithfully reproduce
the relevant sections of Wagner’s report discussed below.
3
applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.”  FED. R. EVID. 702; see Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592–94 (1993).  District courts have a “gatekeeping
role” to ensure that expert testimony admitted into evidence is both reliable and relevant, and to
exclude “junk science.”  Messick v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 747 F.3d 1193, 1197 (9th Cir.
2014); Sundance, Inc. v. DeMonte Fabricating Ltd., 550 F.3d 1356, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Wagner offered opinions labeled as both unjust enrichment and reasonable royalty. 
Other than grade-school arithmetic, however, he did not apply any coherent principle,
methodology, theory, or technique, much less one possessing any discernible indicia of
reliability.  Instead, he made the same arguments that the lawyers can make based on other
evidence in the case that can speak for itself.  As this order now explains, Wagner’s opinions
will be excluded both because they do not qualify as expert testimony under FRE 702 and
because they are substantially more prejudicial than probative under FRE 403.
A. Unjust Enrichment.
Wagner opined that, as to eight of the nine asserted trade secrets Waymo selected for
trial, Uber’s alleged unjust enrichment could be measured in terms of either incremental future
profits or saved development costs as a result of accelerated autonomous-vehicle development. 
As to asserted trade secret number 90, he took a different approach, as explained below.  He
also described a host of “other ways in which Defendants have been unjustly enriched that [he
was] unable to quantify” (see Dkt. No. 1615 ¶¶ 264–65).2
1. Incremental Future Profits.
To quantify incremental future profits from accelerated autonomous-vehicle
development, Wagner relied on an internal presentation slide that had been created by Uber
executive Nina Qi prior to the Ottomotto acquisition to summarize her analysis of how the
acquisition could potentially benefit Uber.  The Qi slide estimated that the entire Ottomotto
acquisition could potentially accelerate Uber’s autonomous-vehicle development timeline by
one to two years.  Based on this estimated acceleration and Uber’s own internal “Rubicon”
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4
business model, the Qi slide estimated that the present value of incremental future profits to
Uber as a result of the Ottomotto acquisition ranged from $836 million (one year) to $1.69
billion (two years) given a “baseline” assumption (thirteen cities covered by 2022), and from
$1.585 billion (one year) to $2.61 billion (two years) given an “optimistic” assumption (thirty
cities covered by 2022) (id. ¶¶ 271–81).
The Qi slide will come into evidence and Waymo can try to hold Uber to those sky-high
numbers.  But Waymo seeks to transmogrify this slide into proof that a single trade secret alone
should top out at the highest number in the slide.  This is a fantastic leap.  Here is a summary of
how Wagner made it.
Assuming that the Qi slide reliably estimated incremental future profits based on
accelerated autonomous-vehicle development, Wagner then purported to estimate how much
time Uber had allegedly saved by misappropriating eight of the nine asserted trade secrets
Waymo had selected for trial.  He had no independent opinion about this.  Instead, he relied on
the opinion of Lambertus Hesselink, another Waymo-hired expert, that Uber had saved two
years just by misappropriating asserted trade secret number 25 and one year just by
misappropriating asserted trade secret number 111.  For asserted trade secret numbers 9, 96, 2,
13, 14, and 7, Wagner cherry-picked from Uber’s interrogatory responses, which estimated how
long it would take an independent contractor to redesign the accused features in its LiDAR
system.  Wagner claimed those estimates represented the amounts of time by which each
asserted trade secret accelerated Uber’s entire autonomous-vehicle development timeline,
despite Uber’s clarification in the very same interrogatory responses that its redesign estimates
“would not significantly or materially impact” its overall development timeline.  For asserted
trade secret number 90, Wagner took a different approach, as explained below (see id. ¶ 284,
Dkt. No. 1786-3 at 46:18–47:15).
Wagner then simply multiplied the dollar amounts from the Qi slide with the units of
saved time taken from other evidence in the case to arrive at his unjust enrichment conclusion,
as quoted now from his report (Dkt. No. 1615 ¶ 285):
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Of course, if each of those asserted trade secrets independently accelerated Uber’s development
timeline as much as Wagner concluded it did, then Uber would have saved nearly four years’
worth of development time and over $5.5 billion (given the “optimistic” assumption) for just
eight specific trade secrets — remarkable figures by any measure, but particularly in
comparison with the Qi slide’s estimate of one to two years and $836 million to $2.61 billion
for the entire Ottomotto acquisition.  (Uber would have saved three years with just numbers 25
and 111, according to Wagner.)
Amazingly, these figures, taken together, far exceed the highest numbers anywhere in
the Qi slide and leave no room for the possibility that the real value of the Ottomotto acquisition
came from legitimate benefits as opposed to the misappropriation of eight specific trade secrets
selected for trial after discovery.
To blur the avaricious optics of overreaching, Wagner added two conclusory sentences
that stated, “If multiple trade secrets are found to be infringed, I have conservatively assumed
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that the accelerated AV development is not additive.  Therefore, only the corresponding unjust
enrichment for the trade secret with the longest period of accelerated AV development should
be awarded” (id. ¶ 286).  Wagner’s report offered no explanation for this assumption, although
Waymo (in briefing) and Wagner (in deposition) subsequently explained that he had assumed
different aspects of LiDAR development could proceed concurrently (see Dkt. Nos. 1777-3 at
12, 1786-3 at 96:5–17).  (That explanation raised other problems, as explained below.)  The
litigation tactic of the assumption, however, is apparent.  Wagner’s emphasis on his supposed
“conservatism,” both in the aforementioned paragraph and throughout his report, was an effort
to appear reasonable despite the astronomical valuations assigned to each of Waymo’s asserted
trade secrets.  Put differently, it was a transparent attempt to skew the damages horizon and
desensitize the jury to the enormity of what Waymo is seeking by contrast with what it
supposedly could have sought.  In short, Wagner’s phony cloak of conservatism was a mere
trial gimmick — a factor that further undercuts the reliability of his opinion.
Wagner’s report left ambiguous whether, in his opinion, the Qi slide actually included
Waymo’s trade secrets as part of its estimation of Ottomotto’s value (which would be consistent
with Waymo’s theory that Uber knowingly misappropriated its trade secrets through Ottomotto)
or whether the Qi slide was useful only as a general formula for converting accelerated
autonomous-vehicle development into incremental future profits (which would undermine
Waymo’s theory that Uber knowingly misappropriated its trade secrets through Ottomotto). 
Either way, however, raises serious problems with the reliability of Wagner’s opinion.
Possibly, Wagner’s (and Waymo’s) theory was that the Qi slide included the value of
Waymo’s trade secrets in its estimation of Ottomotto’s value.  Wagner and Waymo have both
suggested as much, frequently construing evidence in the case to conflate Uber’s expressed
desire for LiDAR technology in general during the Ottomotto acquisition with Uber’s alleged
intent to misappropriate Waymo’s specific trade secrets (see, e.g., Dkt. Nos. 1615 ¶¶ 309–11,
409; 1777-3 at 4 (“Uber was evaluating whether to acquire Otto (and thus, Waymo’s trade
secrets).”), 9 (“Evaluating Waymo’s trade secrets as part of the Otto acquisition, Uber estimated
that Otto could advance these efforts by one to two years.”); 1834-4 at 1 (“[Wagner] is
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calculating Defendants’ unjust enrichment based on how Uber expected the trade secrets to
accelerate its own AV timeline at the time of misappropriation.”), 2 (“As Defendants were
misappropriating Waymo’s trade secrets (i.e., as they were acquiring Otto), Uber calculated the
potential enrichment to itself as of that date.”) (emphasis in original)).  
Under this interpretation, however, the Qi slide would actually contradict Wagner’s
conclusion because it estimated incremental future profits attributable to the entire Ottomotto
acquisition, including legitimate assets like an entire team of engineers with knowledge, skill,
and experience in a highly specialized and in-demand field, as well as legitimate anticipated
benefits for Uber, like the potential to disrupt and slow down the development efforts of
competitors.  Indeed, Wagner himself admitted later in his report that “any gain to Uber from
recruiting engineers and reducing the engineer ranks at Google is unrelated to the
misappropriation of trade secrets” and should therefore not be included in calculating unjust
enrichment (Dkt. No. 1615 ¶¶ 309–11).  Thus, the estimated incremental future profits actually
attributable to trade secret misappropriation would have been far less than the full amounts
stated in the Qi slide and copied by Wagner.  Under this interpretation, Wagner’s reliance on
the Qi slide’s estimates with no apportionment for the legitimate elements of the Ottomotto
acquisition encompassed therein would render his opinion unreliable under FRE 702.
Alternatively, perhaps Wagner (and Waymo) assumed the Qi slide never contemplated
Waymo’s trade secrets in its estimation of Ottomotto’s value, and they relied on the slide only
as a general formula to calculate incremental future profits from saved development time (e.g.,
one year equals $836 million and two years equals $1.69 billion).  Waymo gave an explanation
to this effect when asked why Wagner never apportioned the Qi slide’s estimates between trade
secret misappropriation and the legitimate benefits of acquisition (see Dkt. No. 1863 at
12:21–15:11).  This interpretation would avoid the aforementioned apportionment problem but
still run headlong into other flaws in Wagner’s report.
With respect to asserted trade secret numbers 9, 96, 2, 13, 14, and 7, Wagner purported
to rely on Uber’s interrogatory responses about redesign times but selectively excised parts of
those responses unfavorable to his cause.  Uber specifically noted in its interrogatory responses
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that “schedule times identified for the redesigns . . . would not significantly or materially impact
the timeline for commercialization and rollout of Uber’s fully-autonomous self-driving
technology to the general public” (Dkt. No. 1617-2 at 4 (emphasis added)).  Significantly,
Uber’s caveat actually remains consistent with both Waymo and Wagner’s after-the-fact
explanation that different aspects of LiDAR development could indeed proceed concurrently
(see Dkt. Nos. 1777-3 at 12, 1786-3 at 96:5–17).  Wagner, however, rejected this caveat; in
other words, he seized on the part of the answer he liked and tossed aside the part he disliked.  
Wagner attempted to justify this cherry-picking by quoting Hesselink’s opinion that
Uber’s redesign estimates did not adequately capture its unjust enrichment.  Wagner also
pointed out in his deposition and reply report that LiDAR is important to Uber’s development
(see Dkt. Nos. 1615 ¶ 284, 1777-10 ¶ 74, 1786-3 at 92:18–93:22).  First, it was inconsistent of
Wagner to simultaneously rely on both selective fragments of Uber’s interrogatory responses
and Hesselink’s opinion that those very same interrogatory responses were an unreliable metric
of unjust enrichment.  Wagner’s willingness to stitch together strategic fragments of
contradictory evidence further indicates that he picked facts to suit his conclusions instead of
drawing conclusions from reliable analysis of the facts.  Second, the general proposition that
LiDAR is important to Uber in no way justifies Wagner’s decision to selectively rely on Uber’s
redesign estimates while ignoring its accompanying commentary about the impact of redesign
on its overall development timeline.  Nor does it explain away the tension between Wagner’s
(and Waymo’s) assumptions that (1) each asserted trade secret would bottleneck Uber’s entire
development timeline, yet (2) Waymo’s damages are not additive because different aspects of
LiDAR development could proceed in parallel (see, e.g., Dkt. Nos. 1777-3 at 8, 12; 1786-3 at
96:5–17, 111:14–112:2). 
A separate problem is that Wagner brings no specialized knowledge to the table.  To
repeat, he is not an economist but merely an inactive CPA and inactive lawyer.  Here, for
example, Wagner simply adopted the opinions of others and performed grade-school arithmetic
counsel can do on an easel.  Where is any specialized knowledge?  There is none.  The absence
of any real expertise is a pervasive problem in Wagner’s incremental future profits “analysis,”
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9
though it is clearer with respect to asserted trade secret numbers 25 and 111 because they are
not further complicated by the aforementioned cherry-picking problem.  The rub is that the
evidence Wagner relied on can speak for itself, and his only contribution would be to pile on a
misleading facade of expertise.  His opinion should therefore be excluded under both FRE 702
and FRE 403.  See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595 (“Expert evidence can be both powerful and quite
misleading because of the difficulty in evaluating it.”); United States v. Gadson, 763 F.3d 1189,
1212 (9th Cir. 2014) (expert witnesses may receive “unmerited credibility” for lay testimony
because their testimony is “likely to carry special weight with the jury”).  
To take the examples of asserted trade secret numbers 25 and 111, Wagner essentially
parroted Hesselink’s opinions that they saved Uber two years and one year of development
time, respectively (see Dkt. No. 1615 ¶ 284).  Assuming for the sake of argument that
Hesselink’s opinions regarding saved development time were reliable in the first instance,
Wagner applied no “specialized knowledge” by simply multiplying the units of time espoused
by Hesselink with dollar amounts lifted from the Qi slide (see Dkt. Nos. 1777-3 at 4, 1786-3 at
46:6–47:15).  Straightforward application of grade-school arithmetic to uncomplicated numbers
is well within the ken of the average juror.  There is no reason for Wagner to serve as a
mouthpiece for arguments that Waymo’s lawyers can make.  See, e.g., United States v. Morales,
108 F.3d 1031, 1038 (9th Cir. 1997) (expert witness testimony is admissible under FRE 702 if
the subject matter at issue is “beyond the common knowledge of the average layman”).
Insofar as the Qi slide and other evidence in this case may turn out to be good
barometers of Uber’s expectations going into the Ottomotto acquisition, that evidence can stand
on its own for the jury’s consideration.  Wagner’s ipse dixit and pseudo-“analysis” are nothing
more than lawyer argument dressed up as expert opinion.  His opinion will therefore also be
excluded under FRE 403 because its danger of confusing the issues, misleading the jury, and
causing unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of its lawyer argument.
2. Saved Development Costs.
To quantify the development costs allegedly saved by Uber, Wagner relied on another
internal Uber document about the Ottomotto acquisition that forecasted saving “months” of
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development, wherein each month of development saved translated to $20 million (Dkt. No.
1615 ¶ 292).  Wagner took this internal estimate and, using the same units of time supposedly
saved (discussed above), multiplied the $20 million figure by months supposedly saved to
produce the following results, quoted from his report verbatim (id. ¶ 293):
Wagner then repeated, again in conclusory fashion, that he “conservatively assumed that the
saved development time is not additive,” so “only the corresponding unjust enrichment for the
trade secret with the longest period of saved development time should be awarded” (id. ¶ 295). 
As stated, this assumption was highly suspect, a way to deflect attention from the stratospheric
figures Wagner would assign to each asserted trade secret so as to avoid the absurd result of an
even higher total while preserving high numbers in case the jury finds liability only as to one or
a few asserted trade secrets.  This assumption, the reference to Uber’s internal $20 million
figure, and the basic arithmetic required to produce the foregoing chart represented the totality
of Wagner’s “analysis” regarding saved development costs.
Again, the documents cited by Wagner can independently come into evidence and
counsel can make the argument as well as Wagner, who adds nothing by way of expertise.  The
jury can do the grade-school arithmetic and follow counsel’s closing argument on an easel. 
Wagner’s “analysis” regarding saved development costs should be excluded under FRE 702
because it amounted to nothing more than uncritical acceptance of other evidence in the case,
which can speak for itself, plus some basic arithmetic using a straightforward $20 million figure
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from Uber’s internal documents.  This is not “specialized knowledge” that will help the jury
understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue.  See, e.g., Morales, 108 F.3d at 1038. 
Indeed, Wagner’s “analysis” would not only fail to improve on the probative value of the
evidence he cited but also actually muddy the uncomplicated facts with his facade of expertise. 
See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595; Gadson, 763 F.3d at 1212.  It is “junk science” that should be
excluded under FRE 702, see Messick, 747 F.3d at 1197, and should further be excluded as
substantially more prejudicial and misleading than probative under FRE 403.3
3. Asserted Trade Secret Number 90.
Asserted trade secret number 90 received Wagner’s separate consideration.  To quantify
Uber’s alleged unjust enrichment with respect to asserted trade secret number 90, Wagner again
adopted wholesale Hesselink’s opinion that (1) Tyto, another autonomous-vehicle company that
Waymo claims was surreptitiously owned by Levandowski, spent two years and five months
using asserted trade secret number 90 to develop its product, and (2) Uber acquired Tyto in
2016, so (3) defendants saved two years and five months by misappropriating asserted trade
secret number 90 (Dkt. No. 1615 ¶¶ 298–99).  Wagner then noted that Uber paid a total of 
 in consideration for Tyto (id. ¶¶ 301, 304, 306).  From this he
concluded that “the  cash consideration is a reasonable number to use for the unjust
enrichment of Defendants related to Trade Secret No. 90” (id. ¶¶ 307–08).
It will suffice to simply point out one glaring problem in Wagner’s “analysis,” namely
that he made no attempt to apportion the alleged acceleration of Uber’s development timeline
between legitimate benefits and trade secret misappropriation.  Indeed, Wagner agreed in
deposition that the  dollars of consideration accounted for “a number of benefits,”
including Tyto’s employees, certain legitimate forms of intellectual property, and some tangible
property, yet he did no work whatsoever to account for the value of those legitimate benefits
(see Dkt. No. 1786-3 at 114:4–117:19).  The closest Wagner came to acknowledging this
critical distinction in his report was when he stated, “I recognized that in addition to the
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technology, Defendants were also acquiring five employees from Tyto.  However, Defendants
also paid additional consideration beyond the  cash in the form of  equity in
Ottomotto” (Dkt. No. 1615 ¶ 307).  He never bothered to explain the significance of that equity
but perhaps meant to suggest that it fully accounted for any value Tyto’s employees might have
contributed at any point in time.  If so, this suggestion was wholly inadequate because it (1) did
not even state Wagner’s conclusion but merely left it to implication, (2) flatly contradicted his
deposition testimony that the  dollars of consideration also accounted for Tyto’s
employees, (3) made no attempt to explain how the equity corresponded even approximately to
the legitimate benefits acquired, and (4) still did not account for other legitimate benefits on the
table in the Tyto acquisition, including legitimate forms of intellectual and tangible property.
It was absurd for Wagner to simply attribute Tyto’s full sticker price to the value of a
single asserted trade secret.  His “analysis” as to asserted trade secret number 90 failed to
account for commonsensical factors vital to any reliable computation of unjust enrichment from
trade secret misappropriation in this case.  The analytical chasm between the data he cited and
the opinion he proffered warrants his exclusion under FRE 702.  See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner,
522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997).  Moreover, as with his other opinions, this opinion would be no more
probative than the evidence it cited and would likely distort that evidence with the facade of
expertise.  It, too, should be excluded under both FRE 702 and FRE 403.
4. Unquantifiable Unjust Enrichment.
The final section of Wagner’s unjust enrichment opinion also fails to pass muster under
FRE 702.  To give just one example, Wagner opined (Dkt. No. 1615 ¶ 319 (emphasis added)):
There is evidence that Uber is likely to achieve significant cost
savings over the next several years on its LiDAR sensors, and this
will result in substantial cost savings given the number of vehicles
that it expects to roll out.  Just as an example calculation, if Uber
expects to purchase  vehicles per year, and is developing
its own LiDAR results in volume purchase savings for LiDAR
from the  expected in 2018 down to the  expected in
2020 for savings of  per vehicle, the cost savings would be
$1,895.5 billion per year.  Therefore, depending on the expected
cost of third-party LiDAR at volume, the expected cost savings
could be dramatic.  At this time, I have not found enough evidence
to reliably estimate the cost savings that Uber will achieve based
on developing its own LiDAR, let alone the cost savings
attributable to the misappropriation of the trade secrets. 
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4  In a reasonable royalty analysis, you don’t get both the “base” and the “royalty.”  Plus, neither
CUTSA nor DTSA permits an award of damages measured by both unjust enrichment and a reasonable royalty. 
See 18 U.S.C. 1836(b)(3)(B)(ii); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.3(b).
13
Therefore, I have not performed a specific quantification for the
value to Uber related to cost savings based on lower costs of
LiDAR at this time.
This is just another attempt to surround astronomical numbers with a facade of conservatism. 
In effect, this leaves the impression, “The numbers could go even higher but being conservative
and faithful to reliable data, I will not go there.”  Wagner will not get the opportunity to play
this card and invite the jury to speculate about “significant,” “substantial,” or “dramatic” cost
savings, because his actual opinions will be excluded under both FRE 702 and FRE 403.
B. Reasonable Royalty.
To quantify a reasonable royalty that defendants would have paid for Waymo’s
allegedly misappropriated trade secrets, Wagner began with a hypothetical negotiation in the
December 2015 to August 2016 period and a “baseline royalty” equal to the unjust enrichment
(measured by incremental future profits) that he had calculated earlier (id. ¶¶ 383–85).  He ran
through the Georgia-Pacific factors, concluding that fourteen were either “neutral” or would
tend to increase the reasonable royalty by some unspecified amount while the fifteenth “in
essence synthesizes the fourteen” other factors (id. ¶¶ 386–438).  See generally Georgia-Pacific
Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (listing fifteen
factors pertinent to reasonable royalty calculations for a patent license).  After summing up
these “neutral” or “increase” factors, Wagner then simply concluded, “In my opinion, based on
all the considerations described above, the reasonable royalty that would be agreed to by the
parties is a ten percent (10%) increase over the Baseline Royalty” (Dkt. No. 1615 ¶ 439).  
Mind you, this comes to a total royalty more than ten times greater than a “ten percent”
royalty.  Wagner calls it “ten percent,” evidently to masquerade as more reasonable.  His
reasonable royalty “analysis” is summed up as follows (see id. ¶ 440):4
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not reach them because the foregoing problems are already more than sufficient to warrant Wagner’s exclusion
from our upcoming trial this year.  This order states no opinion as to the admissibility of Wagner’s proposed
supplemental report regarding damages attributable to Waymo’s proposed new software misappropriation
claims (see Dkt. No. 2062 at 20–21).
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Wagner’s reasonable royalty calculation is premised on his unjust enrichment (measured by
incremental future profits) opinion, so it suffers from the same problems discussed above and
should be excluded on this basis alone.  It should also be excluded because he made no attempt
whatsoever to bridge the analytical gap between his discussion of unquantified “neutral” and
“increase” factors in a hypothetical licensing negotiation and his decision to simply raise his
unjust enrichment numbers by ten percent across the board.  See Joiner, 552 U.S. at 146.  
In summary, Wagner’s opinions fail to pass muster under FRE 702 and Daubert.  They
are also substantially more prejudicial than probative and therefore subject to exclusion under
FRE 403.  Defendants’ motion to exclude Wagner’s opinions and testimony is GRANTED.5
2. MOTION TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION.
Defendants move to exclude evidence of (1) Waymo’s estimates of its own investments
in trade secret development relating to autonomous-vehicle technology, (2) Waymo’s future
revenue forecasts and estimated lost profits, and (3) Uber’s financial condition or resources. 
Much of defendants’ motion is actually dedicated to arguments about the inadequacies in
Wagner’s damages opinions and therefore mooted in light of his exclusion.  Similarly, insofar
as Waymo insists that the aforementioned evidence is relevant to Wagner’s damages opinions,
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that argument no longer carries any weight.  This order focuses only on the parties’ arguments
about the actual evidence proffered by Waymo separate and aside from Wagner’s opinions.
First, defendants contend Waymo’s estimates of its own investments are “conclusory,”
improperly calculated, irrelevant to Wagner’s damages theory, and likely to skew the damages
horizon because of their high figures (see Dkt. No. 1557-4 at 2).  Waymo responds that its own
investments — supposedly “between $50 million and $1 billion to develop the individual
asserted trade secrets (over the course of 2–7 years)” — are relevant to corroborate the
reasonableness of Uber’s estimate that each month of saved development time would translate
to $20 million saved (Dkt. No. 1557-12 at 2–3).  It seems unlikely that this type of simple
comparison between two very different corporations’ expenses could add much probative value
to Uber’s internal document containing the $20 million figure, which could speak for itself,
especially given the vast universe of variables that would be swept under the rug.  At this point,
however, it is not clear that this evidence should be excluded outright.  This order therefore
concludes only that Waymo must seek the Court’s advance permission via a written offer of
proof before introducing evidence of Waymo’s estimated investments at trial.
Second, and in a similar vein, defendants contend Waymo’s own future revenue
forecasts and estimated lost profits are irrelevant to its damages theory and likely to skew the
damages horizon for the jury (Dkt. No. 1557-4 at 2–4).  Waymo responds that, like its estimated
investments, its own future revenue forecasts and estimated lost profits are relevant as “checks”
on the reasonableness of Uber’s corresponding figures (Dkt. No. 1557-12 at 3–4).  Again, it
seems unlikely that this proposed comparison would add much probative value to the
straightforward evidence of Uber’s own internal estimates, but conceivably Waymo could still
propose a suitable use for this evidence at trial.  This order therefore concludes Waymo must
also seek the Court’s advance permission via a written offer of proof before introducing
evidence of its future revenue forecasts and estimated lost profits at trial.
Third, defendants assert in conclusory fashion that “Waymo should be precluded from
offering any evidence about Uber’s current revenues, profitability, or other financial resources
because such information is irrelevant and poses a risk of biasing the jury’s award” (Dkt. No.
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1557-4 at 4).  This is not sufficient to justify outright exclusion of such broad swaths of
evidence.  Even without Wagner, it is conceivable that Waymo could present a damages theory
under which Uber’s revenues, profitability, or financial resources may be relevant.  Defendants’
motion as to this evidence is therefore DENIED without prejudice to targeted objections to
specific items of evidence at trial.  As stated herein, their motion to exclude evidence of
financial information is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
3. REMAINDER OF UBER’S MOTION TO STRIKE.
With the benefit of Waymo’s full damages theory and the foregoing rulings, this order
finds that no further relief is necessary under these circumstances to remedy any shortfalls in
Waymo’s initial disclosures.  Insofar as the remainder of Uber’s motion to strike seeks relief
above and beyond what has already been granted herein, it is DENIED.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion to exclude Michael Wagner is GRANTED. 
Their motion to exclude evidence of financial information is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN
PART as stated herein.  Except to the extent stated herein, their motion to strike is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:  November 2, 2017.                                                                
WILLIAM ALSUP
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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